The advent of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement has been widely anticipated. A number of consequences have been predicted, for example, impacts on fares, on passenger volumes, choice and on consumer welfare. Airline costs are also predicted to fall as a result of increased competiveness and increased cooperation among airlines.
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Introduction
There has been widespread interest in the introduction of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement. Before the Agreement commenced, consultancies undertook studies on the likely consequences of an open aviation area for the EU. These major studies by Brattle (2002) and Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) are briefly summarised in Pitfield (2009a along with the comments of government bodies and industry spokesmen.
A special issue of the Journal of Air Transport Management contained papers from the AirNeth meetings in Belgium to which experts were invited to contribute and notable examples are given by Button (2009) and Humphreys and Morrell (2009) . Pitfield has also covered this introductory discussion and undertaken some empirical work on France (Pitfield, forthcoming) and the Netherlands (Pitfield, 2010) 1 .
The EU-US Open Skies Agreement came into force at the end of March 2008 and the main provisions, reported in Pitfield (2009a ) are repeated below:
• Removal of restrictions on route rights -any EU airline is allowed to fly from any EU city to any US city. Conversely, any US airline can fly into any EU airport and from there onto third destinations. In addition, EU airlines can fly between the US and non-EU countries that are members of ECAA, the European Common Aviation Area, such as Norway and Croatia. The unequal treatment of cabotage is 1 These results are repeated below in sections 7 and 8.
an issue; although US airlines can fly onwards in Europe, EU airlines cannot fly domestically in the US.
• Foreign Ownership -the main change here is that US companies can now only own 49 percent of the voting rights in European Airlines, whereas European Airlines can still hold only 25 percent in US airlines, although they can own more in non-voting shares.
It is the intransigence of the US position here, as well as on cabotage, that has led first to a delay in the implementation of the Agreement and then the EU's right to suspend the Agreement if insufficient progress towards a revised Agreement is made by mid-2010.
The mechanism by which there is a resultant change in consumer welfare as a result of the Agreement has been explained in Brattle (2002) and Booz Allen Hamilton (2007). The removal of restrictions on route rights permit the expansion of supply giving greater choice and the increased competition leads to downward pressure on airline costs and so fares.
Prices are also thought to fall as a result of increased cooperation between airlines.
It is clear that the supply side changes may be directly attributed to the Agreement. However, although passenger numbers may change it is difficult to attribute this to the underlying causes given the lack of data on costs and variations in fares. Pitfield (2009a (Pitfield, 2007b) .
As the data from 1990 contains a variety of economic cycles, the expectation might be that the current recession may not appear substantially different to any past cycle as it has not had long enough to reflect its impact on the passenger data. The expectation seems to be that the current recession will last longer than many, but in the data set, even though the appropriate start date might be discussed, it only exists in total for some six or seven months 2 . It cannot, therefore, be distinct at present and is expected as a result not to show significance.
Past experience strongly suggests that 9/11 is well modelled by an abrupt intervention and will be strongly significant. where, as would be expected, the two series move closely together over time.
Passenger Data
In the processes described above, it appeared that there has been a considerable rationalisation of services offered in London for New York, especially in 2008. In addition, an earlier relative decline in the importance of STN was noted, perhaps as it concentrated on low-cost carriers.
Consequently, an exploratory analysis examined shares at LHR over the period and this is shown in Figure 2 . In the early 1990s, LHR share was passengers. However, the load factor over the whole period of operation is very disappointing at 29.84 percent on average, which is much less than the French based service, so it is easy to see why the service was discontinued.
The passenger data are shown in Figure 7 . This shows growth around an apparently constant variance up to early in the 21 st century. The impact of 9/11 is again plain and it appears that although the traffic has recovered, there is no longer an upward trend.
New York
Following The impact of 9/11 is similar in the two models and represents an impact on the whole series that is around 2.4-2.8 percent of total annual traffic on the route in the year 2000.
Washington
For Washington -London traffic an ARIMA(1,0,0)(0,1,1)12 seems to give the best fit with RMSE = 5003.093. The parameters and other goodnessof-fit statistics are shown in Table 2 . As with the New York models, no matter how the downturn or the Agreement interventions are specified, they are insignificant 7 . 9/11 seems to have a negative effect of 22,913 which represents 2.04 percent of year 2000 total traffic 8 .
Focusing on the LHR traffic gives an ARIMA(2,0,1)(0,1,1)12 model; this notation means that the autoregressive parameter is estimated at lags 1 and 2 9 . Parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit are again shown in Table 2 . Not surprisingly, the only intervention term of significance is the 9/11 intervention. Given that the large scale changes in carriers on LHRNew York failed to show a significant impact on passenger traffic from the Agreement, then the other US destinations are unlikely to. It is also true that no measure of the economic downturn is significant.
The 9/11 impact here represents 2.22 percent of year 2000 traffic which is consistent with the other estimates. 7 As there is no non-seasonal differencing, steps and pulses can be examined. 8 The constant term is retained in these models as there is no regular differencing. 9 The first autoregressive parameter is not reported in the table as it is insignificant.
Chicago
For Chicago -London traffic an ARIMA(1,1,0)(0,1,1)12 seems to give the best fit with RMSE = 6466.817. The parameters and other goodness-of-fit statistics are shown in Table 3 . As with the other models, no matter how the Agreement intervention is specified, it is insignificant. However, the downturn intervention represented as an exponential decline is significant in the second model shown in Table 3 and has a negative impact of 18,373. 9/11 also has an earlier negative effect on the series of between Table 3 . As before, apart from the significance of the 9/11 term, the downturn exponential intervention is also significant in one model. The impact of the Agreement is never found to be significant. For 9/11, the intervention varies between 2.61 and 2.64 percent of year 2000 LHR traffic and the absolute estimates are both correctly less than the impacts estimated on London.
It is not intuitively obvious why the representation of the downturn is significant on this corridor and although the result is reported it could be spurious.
Los Angeles
The results for Los Angeles to London and LHR are shown in Table 4 . The ARIMA models differ despite there being little difference in the UK totals 
Paris
Analysing the ACF and PACF plots for the Paris data suggests a variety of suitable models could be calibrated and a logarithmic transformation could be imposed if it was thought that a constant variance did not exist. It seems that a relatively parsimonious model is to be preferred and this is seasonally differenced, has one seasonal moving average term and a single non-seasonal autoregressive parameter with no constant.
When the intervention variables are included, whatever the form, neither the advent of the Agreement nor the start of the BA Open Skies service are found to be significant. As expected, nether is the downturn intervention variable. The ACF plot of the residuals along with the goodness-of-fit statistics suggests that this is a more than acceptable model.
Another outlier in the Paris data that none of these models have been able to account for is found for November 2003. Investigating the traffic in detail suggests that this might be attributed to the activity of Air India on the route but the start of its service does not tie in exactly with the date of the outlier and these attempts to deal with this shift in level were abandoned.
Amsterdam
Experiments with logarithmic transformations and various forms of the model with seasonal components suggested the better model forms to investigate are moving average. The best model is regularly and seasonally differenced with one seasonal moving average parameter and moving average parameters found to be significant in the non-seasonal model component at lag 1 and 4 10 . Pulse representations are used for the independent variables. Table 6 shows the goodness-of-fit statistics and the significant parameters.
Not only is the 9/11 intervention effect significant (-26,760) 
Conclusion
Attempts to determine the impact of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement have been presented from London (and separately from LHR) to four major US cities. In no case has a significant impact on passenger numbers been found. This is especially surprising in the LHR -New York case, where new services were initiated at LHR, often moving from other London area airports. However, the variation in airline strategic behaviour implicitly modelled in the time series from 1990 shows that there is nothing significantly different in recent variations in passenger numbers that needs to be explained where these variations may have resulted from the Agreement. No particular boost or discontinuity in passenger numbers was found beyond that which could be explained by airlines' choice of frequency, aircraft size and fare setting already implicit in the model since 1990.
In every route examined, significant impacts were found for 9/11 and were not found for the economic downturn. Both of these findings are expected as 9/11's impact has previously been established and the downturn in the data up to March 2009 will look no different to previous downturns encapsulated in the variation in passenger data from 1990. To establish any impact will require a longer data series 11 .
If this modelling attempt has failed to find an impact on passenger numbers it may be judged that the case that the data initiatives on fares, costs and competition is less compelling.
If the impact of the start of the BA Open Skies service from Paris is focused on, where this was facilitated by the Agreement, the fact that it has not been found to have a significant impact on traffic may not be surprising given the scale of the traffic and the relatively short period of operation. However, as it was stated in Pitfield (forthcoming) 
